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CHAIRMAN ALAN ROBBINS: I'd ask everyone to take a seat. This is the latest that the 
Senate Insurance Committee has ever started a hearing. But because of the importance of our guests 
today, we'll live with that one blemish on our punctuality record. 
This is a joint hearing of the Senate Insurance, Claims and Corporations Committee, the Senate 
Transportation Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee. There are a number of Members 
who are coming who unfortunately have been delayed by the visit in town and the luncheon that's 
taking place with a group of professional football players from San Francisco. Pardon? The people 
who are standing in front of them need insurance. But they will be -- a number of our other 
legislators will be joining us in addition to Senator Kopp at my right who's Chair of the Senate 
Transportation Committee; to my left is Senator Davis who sits as a Member of the Senate Insurance 
Committee; Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly who's joined us at our request; Assemblyman Tom Hayden 
who's joined us at our request, and Senator Cecil Green who .sits on the Senate Insurance Committee. 
Let me say just very briefly that our Committee has taken very seriously its task of working on 
the implementation of Proposition 103. It has certainly dramatically changed, not only insurance law 
in California but indeed I think the entire political picture surrounding insurance in California. And 
as a result of its passage, I think more and more Members of the Legislature are interested in the 
subject of insurance. Many Members who, a year ago, rarely had any understanding of what the word 
meant except that it's name was usually in the name of some insurance company that was on their 
contributor list. Today, more legislators are interested and I think it has given a renewed spirit to 
those of us who have been interested in the issue in the past but who are now, have a stirred 
electorate to assist in the area of insurance reform. 
With us today for the Committee are two gentlemen who really need no introduction but you'll 
get a brief one anyhow. Harvey Rosenfield and Ralph Nader were the cosponsors of Proposition 103 
in our state. It was approved by the electorate. 
Mr. Nader, of course, has been a consumer spokesperson for years on the national level, has 
been known to voters in the State of California. And if I may give my own surmise, the fact that two 
of the propositions that were sponsored on the ballot were sponsored by the insurance companies and 
two were sponsored by the trial lawyers and one was sponsored by Ralph Nader. I don't know if this is 
a great compliment, but you're more popular than the insurance companies or the trial lawyers in the 
State of California. I take that back. Three were sponsored by the insurance companies; one was 
sponsored by the trial lawyers and one was sponsored by Mr. Nader. And Mr. Nader, you're definitely 
more popular than those two entities. But even more so than that, despite the fact that tens of 
millions of dollars was spent on the campaign against Proposition 103, the voters chose to take a 
chance on the brand that you had endorsed. 
Harvey Rosenfield is, of course, a very familiar part of our Committee and has been gracious 
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enough to participate in all of our hearings on the implementation of Proposition 103, has not 
hesitated when necessary to prod the Members of this Committee or the Chair of this Committee and 
has become a genuine local folk hero here in California, somewhat akin to Howard Jarvis and what he 
did with Proposition 1], that has litE-rally chang0d tlw conn"pt of h,,\\' tlllt<·h l:ntng V.•'\'<'rnm,•nl ,·,m 
get away with over the last ten years. 
Having said all of those nice things, I'd like to turn the mike over to you and perhaps to have 
you give us maybe about a 15-minute summary of your perspective, or longer, if you wish, and then 
the Members of the Committee and the-- I mean the legislators that we've asked to sit in with us--
will be given the opportunity to ask you whatever questions they have. So through an exchange, we 
will seek the truth and hear the information and hear what you have to say. 
Mr. Nader, the mike is yours. 
MR. RALPH NADER: Thank you, Senator Robbins and Members of the Committee on Insurance 
Claims and Corporations. I have -- sorry. The Committee on Transportation and Judiciary, and the 
two Assemblymen. Have I covered everybody? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: You could just say "and Senator Kopp". 
MR. NADER: I'd like to submit for the record my complete testimony which covers both the 
reasons why conditions led to 103 and how 103 was enacted, what 103 means, not only here in 
California but around the country, as well as the characterization of the insurance industry's 
response, both pre- and post-103. There's also an attached letter that I've written to Chairman 
James Lynn of Aetna Insurance Company focusing on loss prevention and a copy of an article I wrote 
in Suffolk Law Review on the issue of the insurance industry's obligation to become the sentinels for 
health and safety as part of their loss prevention responsibilities. 
I'd like to submit all that for the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, and then 
summarize some of the points that I wish to make today. 
I want to thank you for the invitation to discuss Proposition 103 and the impact that it had, not 
only on California consumers, businesses, nonprofits, municipalities, but also throughout the nation, 
its energizing repercussions as citizens mobilized in state after state and to follow the leadership of 
the voters of California in bringing the insurance industry to greater levels of disclosure, greater 
levels of accountability, and higher levels of loss prevention standards. 
It does seem, however, that the insurance companies are behaving as if the Supreme Court of 
California has stayed the entire Proposition 103 instead of two provisions. They're behaving almost 
as if the voters of California hadn't approved 103. We're seeing here, in almost uniformally 
institutional defiance of Proposition 103 by insurance companies, not only in not taking advantage of 
certain marketing opportunities, such as moving to sell group auto and group homeowner insurance 
policies throughout the state, which Prop. 103 now permits, having repealed the past restrictions in 
California's law against those kinds of group purchasing practices, but they also seem to be engaged 
in a process of huffing and puffing and intimidation and threatening to pull out of the state or 
canceling policies, not renewing policies, and recently, actually increasing insurance premium rates in 
some instances. 
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They are being aided and abetted in this institutional defiance of Prop. 103 by probably one of 
the most lackidaisical insurance commissioners that I've ever had the displeasure to observe 
throughout these United States, Roxani Gillespie, who, of course, made no secret of her antipathy and 
antagonism for Prop. 103 before election day in November. And, of course, her supervisor, 
Governor Deukmejian who, again, made no secret of his opposition to Prop. 103 before the voters 
rendered their verdict and since then they've certainly been lukewarm in instructing the Insurance 
Commissioner to begin enforcing all those provisions of 103 which have not been stayed by the 
Supreme Court of California. 
Now this, of course, is leading to an attitude among many people in the state that can be 
characterized at in some segments of the population as anger, indignation, and the demand that this 
proposition be enforced. Other segments of the population have become more fatalistic, more 
resigned, saying, "What good is our vote? We voted Prop. 103 in and we haven't seen its provisions 
implemented." Other people have an even more withdraw! characteristic in this repect of what kind 
of resignation as to whether it makes any difference to vote at all. These kinds of feedbacks have 
been coming into the canvassers who are going door to door for Voter Revolt. And I think that they 
tell us that there's an added dimension here that should not be ignored, and that is, when people vote 
into law, they expect their elected representatives to move, to all dispatch in support of this law, 
having the kind of public hearings that you've been having, and they expect the executive branch to 
do likewise, as the Attorney General has been doing, John Van de Kamp. And if they don't see this, 
they can go one of both ways, one of two ways: One, they can become very resigned and turn off, 
which is not good for democracy; or they can become tremendously aggressive in moving for a major 
follow-up drive, which may not be good for many elected representatives. 
So I think it is important that you recognize that there's a tremendous relia.-·1ce on that vote in 
November on behalf of Prop. 103, its 2.0 percent cut, reduction, in insurance rates as of November of 
1987. It's exposing the antitrust law enforcement against these companies who've been engaged in a 
great deal of ratemaking collusion, and having an elected Insurance Commissioner in requiring prior 
approval of any auto insurance and other liability commercial insurance rate increases before the 
selected insurance commissioner, and encouragement of group buying of auto and homeowner 
insurance, in addition to requiring disclosure by the insurance companies of information so that never 
again these companies can go trying to whipsaw the public into submission underneath their arbitrary 
classifications, their discrimination, their massive reliance on territorial rating, and their under-
reliance on good-driver record. 
So we now, of course, have to await the Supreme Court of California's decision, knowing full 
well that it's a much more business-oriented court than it was two years ago. We also have to look 
forward to the utilization of the provisions of Prop. 103, as we did yesterday with a Senior Center in 
Southern California where hundreds of senior citizens demonstrated their determination to start 
banding together and demanding that they be sold group auto insurance policies which will lead to 
significant cutbacks in insurance rates because the economies of scale and the absence of 
promotional and advertising expenses to land such customers and the ability of group auto insurers 
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to -- insureds, rather, to -- bargain with the various insurance companies bidding for their 
business -- all of these factors certainly foresee a significant reduction in auto insurance rates and, I 
might add, the same pattern with obtaining homeowner insurance rates. 
Now I'd like to point out that the insurance companies have continually postured after any 
defeat in any state. They did this in Florida when they were forced to roll back their rates. They 
threatened to pull out of Florida. They threatened to cancel. They huffed and they puffed and the 
state government stood firm, and the insurance companies got over their withdrawal pains and they 
resumed their normal pattern of business. 
I was just speaking with an insurance agent/broker in a Washington, D.C., suburbs and he said, 
"You know, it really is amazing the way these insurance companies postured right after Prop. 103 
won." He said, "But now they're doing business, and they know that they're going to still make money 
in California." He said, "Even we, we opened an office last year in California. We thought, gee, 
Prop. 103, maybe we shouldn't have opened the office." He said, "We're doing very well." I think he 
might have even been more candid because a few minutes later, when I was discussing the reinsurance 
companies, he launched into this tirade against Lloyd's of London and other reinsurers and they say, 
"We're still not moderating their rates and are still whipsawing the primary insurers with 
repercussions to customers all over the country," to which I said, "Well, don't you think the reinsurers 
ought to be under similar disclosure and regulation as the primary insurers, especially the offshore 
insurers like Lloyd's of London?" He said, "Absolutely." 
And that's one of my first recommendations to you, Mr. Chairman, is that you initiate what no 
other state has yet initiated, and that is, an investigation to Lloyd's of London as the lead and 
dominant reinsurer whose practices and policies are followed by reinsurers as far away as Munich Re 
and Swiss Re, in Western Europe, to domestically based reinsurers in the United States. The 
reinsurance factor is very key to launching these gyrations in the insurance cycle, destablizing the 
primary insurers, who then transfer the destablization onto the day care centers, the trucking firms, 
the doctors, the hospitals, as well as auto owners and other consumers throughout the state. The 
Congress certainly should do this as well. But if the Congress is g0ing to drag its feet, the way it has 
been on reinsurance over the last several years, why not start with the next best thing in terms of 
size, which is the State of California? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me ask you briefly on the subject of reinsurance. We had started to 
tackle it, and this Committee has taken an interest sometime in reinsurance, two years ago, of 
proposed legislation that was defeated, like many bills are by the insurance companies, to limit 
reinsurance and to require that at least 10 percent of any policy be retained by the company writing 
the policy rather than to reinsure 100 percent of the policy in order to get some degree of 
responsibility with the company issuing the policy. 
Other than that type of legislation, what else can specifically be done at the state level to deal 
with the reinsurance companies, most of whom are international in scope? 
MR. NADER: Well, first of all, I understand the trend is in the reverse, that is, the primary 
insurers are having to swallow a larger portion of the risks. 
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Now let me answer your question with one prefatory remark. Lloyd's of London does not 
release its annual profits, except three years later. In other words, they just released their 1985 
profits. In 1985, Lloyd's of London was screaming poverty, near bankruptcy, inability to underwrite 
risks because of runaway juries, judges, and lawyers in the United States of America. Just a few days 
ago, they released their 1985 profits, record profits. And one can only imagine what their 1986 and 
'87 profits are going to be because that's been a curve in the primary markets have been, record 
profits. 
Secondly, here's what California can do: They can require Lloyd's of London to justify their 
reinsurance criteria so that when Lloyd's of London says, "Sorry, we're going to have to sock it to a 
nonprofit group of board of directors, and we're going to have to sock it to day care center 
reinsurance," you can say to Lloyd's of London, under a new California law, "Prove it. How much 
have you taken in from day care center reinsurance? How much have you paid out? How much have 
you reserved? And where's the rest of the money?" So disclosure, a whole series of disclosure 
requirements, is important there as well. 
I think also you can press them to release their financial data more currently. You know, they 
have tremendous leverage over regulators, when they can say they're losing money and they don't 
have to show it until three years later. And they got away with a lot of arm twisting in this country 
because I'm afraid too many state legislators believed them. Of course, Lloyd's did suffer losses in 
that year in hurricanes and other things not related to liability. But that's not the liability part that's 
part of the problem. And I might add, that even though they suffered these hurricane losses, they've 
always made money. Lloyd's, by the way, is not a corporation. It's a collection of partnerships where 
wealthy people invest $150,000 and up. They become members and it's a tremendous tax advantage. 
You get these wealthy people from all over the world to join, and they've been expanding their 
capacity rapidly in the last year. 
We have finished a report on Lloyd's of London about eight months ago. I also want to make 
sure that the Committee ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I would like to have Lloyd's of London referred to California, actually, 
to the liability system of California, as the Black Hole of California at one point, a few years ago. I 
think it would be entirely appropriate for this Committee to invite Lloyd's of London to have the 
opportunity to come forward and provide the answers to all of the questions that you're asking and to 
provide the documented information on their losses and profits. 
MR. NADER: Can you require them to come forward? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Well ••. 
MR. NADER: You're on the verge of a historic pronouncement, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We take a very aggressive approach in this Committee. But to the best 
of my knowledge, since Lloyd's of London does maintain an office in California, we can require their 
California representative to come forward and to obtain for us the information from what I suspect 
they would refer to as "home office". 
MR. NADER: I think that California is such a large market and over the years has been a 
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golden hole, not a black hole, for Lloyd's of London that you should invite the Chief Executive Officer 
of Lloyd's of London to come and testify as the most responsible and presumably knowledgeable 
person in the organization. That's important. Otherwise, what they'll do is they'll send, they'll send 
their lawyer from LeBoeuf and Lamb, a law firm in New York. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I agree with you and this Committee shall do exactly, exactly that. 
And Senator Davis, who is about to say something, will have the opportunity to assist them in 
explaining the losses that they've suffered. 
SENATOR ED DAVIS: Well, let me say, you know, we're talking nonsense-- Lloyd's of London 
doesn't write insurance. They properly talked about their being a group of partners who come under 
one roof now. They're all individual little combines and are gamblers.. to go back there and say, 
"We want to lay off some facts to you." And I don't think there's any way in the world that the State 
of California can regulate a lot of individual partners in London. You don't have a Lloyd's of London 
Insurance Company. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Yes, but you have a Lloyd's of London Reinsurance Company that says 
to a particular segment of the California insurance industry, the child care segment, we're going to 
increase what we charge you for reinsurance so you're going to have to increase what you charge for 
your insurance. And while certainly we have no ability to regulate them, we have the ability to ask 
them to appear and to give them the opportunity to put their financial information out in the 
spotlight of public attention. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Before you just (inaudible) , don't forget that an awful lot of this 
reinvestment is done -- reinsurance is done -- in Berlin now and Frankfurt and other German cities. 
I guess, if we're going to expand now, we're going to take over the world. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: No. 
SENATOR DAVIS: You better straighten the mess out here before •.• 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: We're going to assist in any way that we can in getting as much 
information and disclosure to the public out there of what's going on so that if Lloyd's of London is 
being treated unfairly and losing all these bets, then they'll have an opportunity to explain that. If 
they're winning large bets at the expense of the California insurance consumer, then they should not 
be unwilling to explain what it is they bet and how much they've won. 
SENATOR QUENTIN KOPP: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Kopp. 
SENATOR KOPP: Well, I know we're using some colorful metaphors here. But I want to ask •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: That's just because the 49ers are in town and delayed the start of my 
hearing. 
SENATOR KOPP: I wanted to ask Mr. Nader-- this is a situation and this is the problem which 
is presented. I guess your argument is that reinsurers have a direct effect upon the price of insurance 
to the consumers of California. And at the same time, Senator Robbins referred to perhaps adopting 
a rule which would require primary insurers to retain at least 10 percent of coverage. And you 
suggested in one of your first remarks that indeed that is happening to a larger extent. I am 
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interested in what your recommendation would be, irrespective of whether we have long-arm 
jurisdiction over Lloyd's of London or some West Germany company. 
MR. NADER: You mean on this legislation? 
SENATOR KOPP: Well, yeah, yeah, on the whole .•. 
MR. NADER: (Inaudible) , you mean? 
SENATOR KOPP: Yeah, on the whole element of reducing the amount and extent of 
reinsurance because that would seem to me to be another way of reaching an answer to the problem. 
MR. NADER: Yes, but that can have effects in terms of reducing the willingness of certain 
companies to take on certain risks. See, the key thing is to make sure they're both solid. I think the 
key thing is to make sure that the primary insurers and the reinsurers are solvent, do not engage in 
arbitrary, discriminatory practice, do not engage in collusive pricing practices. Those are the 
questions you want. But once you start getting an arbitrary percentage, you might affect the 
willingness, indeed, the capacity, of the primary insurer to take on the risks and then lay them off on 
the reinsurer. There are much better ways to make sure they're both operating in a healthy, 
undiscriminatory and actuarially sound manner and the way they assess the risks and underwriting 
prices. 
SENATOR KOPP: Without any overriding rule by statute or otherwise that would require 
primary insured to retain so much coverage? 
MR. NADER: Not unless you see a real clear abuse, not unless you see a real withdrawal from 
the reinsurance market in order to bring the primary companies to their knees or their customers' 
(inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: A brief question or comment and then he's going to resume. 
SENATOR DAVIS: A very, very brief comment. I endorse trying to get somebody who can 
represent the reinsurers (inaudible) Lloyd's to come here to tell us why (inaudible) what 
you'd hear is a terribly distorted California court system that makes this an impossible place to 
reinsure at the same rate you can reinsure in many other states and in many other countries. And so 
I'm all for getting the representatives here from the reinsurers, from Lloyd's, and we'd even pay their 
expenses. I think it would be worth it. We can learn something about the real problems of insurance. 
The underlying problems are the terribly distorted court system in California. 
MR. NADER: Let me just (inaudible) Senator Davis. First of all, Lloyd's itself will admit 
that by far the most lucrative market in the world for Lloyd's, year after year, has been the United 
States. 
Secondly, I think we have to remember that Lloyd's would prefer that our legal system goes to 
the lowest British common denominator, where the juries have very little role, if any, in determining 
damages where punitive damages are unknown, where there's no contingent fee opening the 
courtroom door to lower economic classes, where the difficulty of getting evidence into the trial is 
insuperably higher in England. They would like that. They would like a legal system where victims of 
the drug Oraflex, produced by Eli Lilly in England, were just paid, after five years of litigation, in 
settlement, $3,100 each, which, I might add, was less than what the Chairman of Eli Lilly makes in 
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one day. And these are horribly damaged -- their skin is falling off, elderly people, liver damage --
horrible damage widely publicized in England. Or in this country, the same victims of Oraflex 
received verdicts of $250,000 to $400,000 settlements, in that area, if not more. I'm sure Lloyd's 
would love to bring our country's legal system down to their ways like medieval status in England at 
the same time. And so that shouldn't be a surprise to any of us. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Lloyd's will be invited to appear, be asked to expose the financial 
information, and be given an opportunity to state their views. Mr. Nader. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LLOYD CONNELLY: Mr. Chairman, would you just be sure not to refer to 
them as Lloyd's. Say Lloyd's of London every time. (Laughter) 
MR. NADER: Well taken. I can understand your sensitivity. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Please continue. 
MR. NADER: All right. Now I'd like to focus on the issue of loss prevention. If the insurance 
companies are going to behave as if they're just a pass-through mechanism, what do we need 
insurance companies for? The best pass-through mechanism of insurance is Medi-Care and Social 
Security. It takes about 3 cents on a dollar to deliver Medi-Care. The justification for a private 
insurance industry is not to behave like a pass-through mechanism. It's to first and foremost be 
active in loss prevention, in analyzing work place hazards and unsafe automobiles and traffic 
congestion and speed limits and bumper standards and become an advocate for the kind of measures, 
both in the marketplace through differential rating of differential car repair and experience, as car 
safety experience, and by having public and enforceable safety standards to keep its claims down. 
The best way to keep claims down and to keep the cost of the insurance companies down is to make 
sure that safety and health advance in such concrete, pragmatic ways that fewer people get killed, 
fewer people are injured, fewer people come down with diseases, fewer dollars are devoted to 
damage. 
Now look at the record. When Mr. Reagan pushed, at the request of General Motors, to be sure, 
in the early 80s, to reduce the bumper standards from 5 miles per hour protective level to 2~, the 
insurance companies issued a statement saying it's going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars more 
a year in these fender-bender collision expenses. Yet, did they put the muscle on in those critical 
few weeks when we were trying to save that standard, the awesome muscle of insurance agents 
around the country, their executives? No. The standard went down to 2Yz; GM went down to 2~. 
That's less than walking speed-- a bumper standard. 
One or two of the companies did file a lawsuit; they didn't win but this was a lobbying effort 
through Congress which they could have. Basically, they didn't do much at all. They then recognized 
that going from 55 to 65 was not only going to be more fuel inefficient, but it was going to kill X 
numbers of people and generate more injury. They didn't lift a finger on that except that they said 
that the rates were going to go up if the standard was allowed to go to 65 miles. They had predicted 
that the rates would go up. 
Thirdly, let's take the pompous Fireman's Fund Company, one of my favorite examples of 
insurance pompousity. Look at this: Fireman's Fund. Remember the name. Remember the name. 
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In 1982., Andy McGuire of the Trauma Foundation from San Francisco, probably known to you, 
he became very interested in trying to get support for the development of a fire-safe cigarette. He 
learned from the various national data-gathering safety institutes that between 1,500 and 2.,000 
deaths from fire were due to fire -- were due to cigarettes -- that the cigarette was the leading 
cause of fire in this country, bar none; and that of the 5,500 deaths a year, almost 2.,000 were from 
cigarette-caused fires in the homes elsewhere. He was concerned because our country has the 
highest fire death fatality rate per capita of any western country, three times that of Japan. 
He also was concerned because the insurance companies had displayed a remarkable 
indifference toward trying to reduce fire. A scholar at Harvard accused him a number of years ago 
of wanting to preserve their market -- we've got to have fires. And you sell more fire insurance and 
you charge more. Well, Mr. McGuire was not that jaded. He went to the Chairman of Fireman's 
Fund, Myron Dubane, who referred him to John Kennedy, who was then ahead of Legislative Affairs 
for the Fireman Fund. And he went to John Kennedy and asked him to support Senator Cranston's bill 
in Congress to push, to regulate the cigarette so it is more fire resistant. This is technically feasible. 
Two tobacco companies have developed a fire-safe cigarette. 900 of these cigarettes are in cold 
storage, as we speak, in the National Bureau of Standards so they don't deteriorate. And John 
Kennedy told Mr. McGuire, he said, quote, "This is of real interest to us but this is a federal issue and 
we don't get involved in federal issues," end quote, a very rough but very rather accurate paraphrase. 
Now the insurance companies always are sensitive to this because they want continued state, 
quote, "regulation", a euphemism, and they don't want to push for any federal standards of safety 
because they think other people would say, "Oh, good enough to regulate X industry federally. Why 
not you?" But then Mr. McGuire said, "Well, we just happen to have a California bill in Sacramento 
to achieve the same goal." And Mr. Kennedy said, "Well, we still didn't think the company would 
support it because it deals with the tobacco industry and the tobacco industry can only be dealt with 
on a national scale." Nice Catch-2.2.. 
Here's the Fireman's Fund, huh? Now my letter to the head of Aetna goes into so;:ne detail in 
terms of the early history of loss prevention when Lloyd's of London did a very good thing in the 17th 
and 18th Century, required that the ships going to the Orient to be equipped with lifeboats; they built 
lighthouses. That's loss prevention. In the 19th Century, they did good work, the insurance 
companies, on boiler safety, the rise of the Industrial Revolution, where boilers would explode and kill 
workers. 
But in recent decades, the insurance companies have become not engineering underwriting 
institutions as much as financial institutions. They would much rather get $1,000 of premium from 
you and pay you just $500 back than get $500 in premium and pay you $2.50 back because in the first 
case, they've got $500 left over to put in investment and get investment income from, which is a big 
factor for them. And in the second case, all they have is $2.50. So they have become a cost-plus type 
of operation, a pass-through mechanism, involving tens of billions of dollars a year. And instead of 
having this colossal vested interest supporting cancer prevention, fire prevention, worker safety, auto 
safety, in a powerful, not a rhetorical way-- they'll give you the rhetoric; they'll show you the 
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resolutions; they'll show you institutions like Underwriting Lab, which are very, very timid. I'm 
talking about using their muscle the way Clay Jackson uses his muscle on some of your colleagues. 
Imagine Clay Jackson fighting for a fire-safe cigarette, fighting for stronger bumpers on cars to 
reduce those hundreds of millions of dollars for expenses to consumers in California, pushing for 
fast~r adoption of air bags to prevent the injuries and the deaths and therefore the claims on his 
client's treasury chest. Imagine Clay Jackson, this man who towers above the Legislature in 
Sacramento, who can simply come to a legislative committee and say, "Ladies and gentlemen, you 
know our opposition to this legislation. Thank you." And the message is conveyed. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Should Mr. Jackson then consider this an endorsement of his product? 
MR. NADER: Excuse me? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Should Mr. Jackson consider your statement an endorsement of his 
product, his lobbying services? 
MR. NADER: It's his endorsement of his unfulfilled power to do good. Now .•• 
SENATOR BILL LOCKYER: Actually, he has a new brochure that points out that the people 
have the right to petition their government and that's what he does. 
MR. NADER: Oh, yeah. I recognize that right which he exercises day by day and night by 
night. But I'm just trying to give it a qualitative redirection. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I don't think Mr. Jackson, having arm wrestled with Mr. Jackson on 
various tobacco legislation, I doubt that he will be pushing for development of a safe cigarette since 
one of his clients happens to be the American Tobacco Institute. 
MR. NADER: Well, may the cries of anguish of burned children's bodies and homes destroyed by 
cigarettes ring in his nightmares. He should be ashamed of himself, but then he has other priorities. 
Now I think that, I think that the insurance industry basically is taking the world as it is. That 
phrase was given to me by a vice president of an insurance company in New England. He said, you 
know-- when I talked to him about loss prevention-- he said, "You know, I guess the insurance 
company just takes the world as it is and then write the risks and then get the money and the pay 
out." And loss prevention means you don't take the world as it is. You elbow that critical insurance 
function in the direction of private and public safety and health standard. But not only do the 
insurance companies take the world as it is but they tend to blame everybody but themselves. You 
would think the juries in California go berserk. You'd think the judges are reading Karl Marx on their 
lunch break. You would think that the Rand Corporation, hardly a radical organization out of 
Santa Monica, which has issued study after study debunking the myth of the litigation explosion, the 
runaway, crazy juries, the expansion of unreasonable imposition of punitive damages, again and again, 
the Rand Corporation studies which, I might add, are partially funded by an increasingly disgruntled 
insurance industry, are coming out reflecting the true data that the stability of the tort system is 
remarkable in accordance with inflation and population growth. You can always point to a crazy 
verdict; you can almost always point to a judge setting it aside or throwing it out or in an appeal 
court reverse it. Very few people point to the legitimate claims that go through trial and don't get a 
cent because juries are pretty tough, oftentimes too tough minded or judges likewise. Those don't 
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lead to any headlines in the Los Angeles Times or San Francisco Chronicle, like the brain-damaged 
tremendous evidence of malpractice in a Virginia hospital, three days of trial by a 
trial lawyer of great integrity who never takes a phony case or who would consider a phony case, he 
zero for that infant and in Jerry Falwell's hometown, Virginia. 
So we should remember that not one out of ten of malpractice cases ever gets a dollar 
verdict or settlement. The total number of malpractice victims getting any money in 1986 was about 
18,000 in the United States. There are easily over 400,000 serious malpractice cases a year in our 
country. And the total transfer in malpractice verdicts or settlements is less than $2 billion a year 
which is less than what we spend on cat food. Business Week had it right, right from the 
article editorial after article editorial, exposing the myth of the runaway verdicts in the 
explosion. And they said that the cause of medical malpractice crisis is malpractice. 
So I would like to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the Committee might do well having an 
information hearing of loss prevention. Let the insurance companies have their say, how they support 
the National Underwriters Lab, $7 million (inaudible) due for highway safety when they can use 
$30 million. But let other groups have their say and let's develop a public expectation level that 
begins to look at their insurance companies with the following muses. I wonder what my insurance 
company has done to get a car built in this country that's less repair prone or with bumpers that 
protect against property damage, or with crash protection that will make my 
secure and crashes that now take lives and limbs. That kind of expectation level will be the ~nost 
fundamental restructuring reform of the insurance industry, in addition with the more day-to-day 
provisions implicit in Proposition 103. A lot of other points that I made .•. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: I don't want you to think that this Committee is quick to respond to 
suggestions but I just had the sergeant give you a piece of legislation that's scheduled for introduction 
tomorrow that would require any insurance company that makes an application for a rate increase 
under Prop. 103 to include within it its Risk Reduction Program and to-- it also requires the 
information on the Risk Reduction Program be contained with each insurance policy issue. So either 
we were thinking along the same line or else my staff has acted remarkably fast in taking --
MR. NADER: I wasn't aware of ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: -- taking your suggestion and getting it ready for legislative 
introduction tomorrow which is the bill introduction deadline here in the Senate. 
MR. NADER: I'm very pleased by that. But I do want -- without seeming ingracious, I do want 
to end by noting page 9 and 10 of my testimony which lists some of the bills which have gotten 
through in this Legislature with very little publicity, chipping away the personal injury rights of 
victims. And I think that when you see this occurring, you see that this ship of state that we call the 
safety rights of injured and sick people to have their day in court is being perforated with holes in the 
in one way after another with bills that don't command great public attention and are propelled 
through the Legislature and signed by Governor Deukmejian. 
For example, what possible justification could there be for a bill that immunizes municipalities 
for injuries to third parties caused by police pursuits? That's when the police take off on very little 
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pretext. A Syracuse police chief once told me, he said, "Some of our boys are like teenagers two 
years removed." You know, they're not seeing a felony, someone out with smoking guns from 
a bank. They just suspect something; they take off; the chase car becomes a missle, crashes into 
another car at a red light. That car, which may have a family of four -- an actual case in California 
-- Washington suburb-- under this law, could not have sued the municipality that the police worked 
for. The same is -- things like eliminating both strict liabilities for injuries caused by prescription 
drugs meeting FDA approval. The FDA is notoriously weak and behind the times in terms of their 
drug standard. And this one was particularly interesting to me on a police dog. Let me see if I can 
find it. A police dog, a bite by a police dog. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Be very careful about what you say about the police with Chief Davis 
seated to ..• 
MR. NADER: I know. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: To my left. 
MR. NADER: I know. What he knows, he knows as a police chief, that some of the officers 
behind the wheel sometimes get carried away with themselves. And there are always police 
department guidelines on hot pursuits. 
Look at this one, "immunizes municipalities from liability for acts of police dogs." That's what 
I mean by chipping away. " immunity for negligence of volunteer directors of nonprofit 
corporations and medical trade associations", "limit punitive damage claims against religious 
corporations." Well, what if they have a truck that's driven by a guy under the influence and kills 
someone? Do you say to the mother of the dead child, "Sorry, it was a religious institution that 
owned that truck"? 
SENATOR LOCKYER: If I may, Mr. Chairman, one of the problems with the way that the list 
has been summarized, Mr. Nader and others, is that it tends to miss some of the subtleties. For 
example, just to give you one example, the most, the last bill you mentioned was that by 
Senator Doolittle on religious organizations. The debate, which was a rather serious one, involved an 
assertion of First Amendment Constitutional claims that were being burdened by tort system factors. 
Now that's -- people might decide those in different ways but at least it was a serious discussion 
about important matters. The result was to require a pleading hurdle. It doesn't grant an immunity. 
It simply says before you can bring a punitive damage claim against the religious organization, you 
should show the court that there is some reasonable basis for punitive damages, not as we have often 
been told, sort of legal harassment which terrorizes people because they can't insure against 
punitives. So the bill in fact is much more, much less, restrictive of a right to recover than perhaps 
the brief description or summary of it in the list. So, you know, I could do that with each one of 
the -- I wouldn't to take a lot of time to do it. 
MR. NADER: I know. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: To make that general point. 
MR. NADER: You see, it's all in the direction of making it more difficult. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: Of course. 
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MR. NADER: Like let me 
SENATOR LOCKYER: Yes. 
MR. NADER: It provides im 
argument you 
which you could make a case. 
to restaurants donating food to a nonprofit food bank. The 
not a.'1.y money on this. giving their food to a 
food bank. But we all know that the prospect of liability tends to make more 
careful. If are u.u•uc•uu~=> the food to a food getting the P.R., you know, 
P.R. good for business And what if become negligent in this area? 
here if we donate the food. worry about the fact that it 
be That cream in be a little So it's chipping, 
chipping, And while it may not seem much per bill. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: understand. 
MR. NADER: it becomes more and more. Am I correct ... 
SENATOR LOCKYER: I the frankly, was to address this current 
discussion which now the insurance industries have suffered. have Prop. 103. But the 
other you know, some think it as the lawyers versus, and all that's 
other side made any concessions o:r ~··~·"'~·~ in the way business and so I 
stake, the 
forward 
with a, I think, extensive list and not one which I you but saying here are the 
cases in which we have balanced individual recovery some social purpose. 
And least these cases, a much would be that which we voted down. But at least in 
these we have immunities, constraints -- and thinking it's a 
matter -- but and ask you to comment if you would. As I recall 
these the average in California in a personal action is about $9,200, at least 
the last time these were obtained. The costs associated with those disputed 
resolutions is almost to seems a transactional cost hard to defend. So 
all the time for ways to and economize with resources, understanding 
a cause of action but that that may entail some of what would be viewed as a 
trying to do more dispute resolution with less and less resources as every institution feels the 
of fewer and resources. And most of these really were ected to those kinds of tests. 
I know what other ways there are. We've tried to talk about arbitration or a neighborhood 
dispute, resolution centers, or alternatives that would perhaps be less expensive. But when the public 
costs are the equivalent of that which the victim gets in these it seems to be a 
burden. 
MR. NADER: But my experience in the way these little bills get through around the country at 
the state level is that usually through because extremely narrow. They 
arouse a And have one anecdote behind two little anecdotes. 
e states now have been a bill which makes it very to sue a physician for 
if the physician is treating an indigent patient without the prospect of payment directly. 
That's a terrible ... 
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And company, Mr. Rosenfield, does not fall within Farmers and and 
is that neither you nor Mr. N ade:r would have any ection -- if you 
want to hear it -- that they be exempt because they write only for these people, be exempt from 
. Is my information correct or my information is 
ROSENFIELD: You mean from the rate control of 103 
DEDDEH: not rate but to do whatever 
write insurance to you and to me. write to 
members of the and of the company. 
MR. ROSENFIELD: I think I understand what your Senator. in 
To everybody. 
MR. ROSENFIELD: -- to everybody. Because of the nature of the and 
attention that this issue has been paid, if you want to discuss this with us, we'd be to it. 
j 
SENATOR DEDDEH: I would like to do that because I do have plans to introduce a not 
them from the of 103, for their rates and so, but to have them, that exclusive 
whatever to write only, and only to these 
MR. ROSENFIELD: to discuss with you our intention. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: the way, you can solve the USAA not without 
creates their is the cross of the Rosenthal-Robbins Insurance 
Act that says you 
103. You can do it by 
discriminate on occupation when that's interfaced with 
the Rosenthal-Robbins Act to deal with your definition of 
to allow a military company, to ••• 
DEDDEH: Mr. Chairman, is that your SB 103? 
ROBBINS: that is not SB 103. a bill that we several years 
when with 103, creates the problem but you can solve their 
an amendment to that act :rather than making an amendment to Prop. 103. 
SENATOR DEDDEH: If an amendment to that particular they will be back in 
the were to 103? 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Without touching 103. 103 doesn't create their the 
combination of the two that does. 
SENATOR DEDDEH: like to help resolve that problem but I do not know how to do t. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: get you ••• 
SENATOR DEDDEH: I don't want to offend anybody's, any of the witnesses any more than I 
offend the Chair. So I would like to work with the Chair and Mr. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: not offended; I'm not offended. We'll the 
ATOR DEDDEH: All Great, great. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Lockyer, and then .•• 
SENATOR LOCKYER: I guess a similar inquiry as to a related form of insurance that was 
excluded from 103 but many of us are concerned about is worker compensation. Now~ 
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a different bundle of issues and I could understand why you drew the line you did. But 
a form of insurance that is highly profitable, from all we could and in 
noncompetitive, that is, the State sets the price and that's what you have to pay. And then 
you may get a rebate. It seems like a circumstance very for insurance 
would benefit workers and business people. I don't know if you're contemplating any additionai 
in that area or if you have thoughts about it. If there are om~s, I'd appreciate 
MR. ROSENFIELD: Senator, my understanding is that there are others who are 
an initiative. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: Okay. 
MR. ROSENFIELD: Right now, most of our -- all of our resources •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: He just wants to make sure you don't have idle time on your hands 
results in your being forced to .•. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: Mr. Chairman, if I may, one other and guess we can 
of share prospectives on this and perhaps that's the most I can do. For those of us 
our ob is to act as a social glue in a very plural and diverse 
Nader mentioned, specifically, SB 241, with that whole list of bills that we have 
of away at the tort system, that was supported by trial 
on the belief that the business and medical com was about to 
ways that would result in very, very extreme rollbacks, cuts in tort recovery 
And so it was kind of a tactful choice and it's a difficult one and it's one I, you know, raise for any 
comments you may make, of whether it is better to just maintain the pure position, ru"'ld I could 
understand advocates setting those kind of standards. But for those in who 
sort of mediative responsibility, whether we should stay pure and fight, at least at the time the 
belief that we were outgunned so much, we would lose; or whether we should make some modest 
accommodation where they seem reasonable in order to postpone that fight. 
obviousiy, the same issues in the 103, 104 context, they had a lot of fire power and you 
won. I'm not sure that same thing would have happened with respect to victims' rights rather than 
more direct, economic benefit that a consumer would feel with their personal auto insurance. If 
could comment on that. 
MR. NADER: I have two comments. I always thought that they would never have had to reach 
the napkin in the restaurant stage, had in the spring. They had put forth a credible initiative of 
The insurance industry put forth a credible initiative threat. The trial lawyers did not 
forth the prospect of the credible initiative. Therefore, they got themselves cornered by the 
SENATOR LOCKYER: In terms of the tactical situation. 
MR. NADER: Yeah. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: Yeah. 
MR. NADER: Secondly-- yeah, that's what I wanted to say about that. What was the other 
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LOCKYER: how those assessments in what worker comp. --
assessments. 
NADER: I was to say, that in there was an initiative last November 
for a lifetime to $100,000. And the doctors and the 
or $15 million and they lost, quite decisive. So there was ... 
SENATOR LOCKYER: How much was spent on the other side? 
About $10 So there was a tort reform issue. 
LOCKYER: True 
NADER: Yeah. There was a tort reform ••• 
LOCKYER: Sounds like a lot of money on both sides. 
there was. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: But at least that side ... 
I mean it was 
SENATOR LOCKYER: So 
The trial 
SENATOR LOCKYER: 
NADER: And the medical association. And all the newspapers came in on the side of the 
Miami Herald. It was very newspapers -- Orlando 
doctor on a radio talk show. And I you want to limit a person 
and and many doctors in Florida make that much three 
" I mean it's really an incredible -- it's how 
who deal with pain every day, doctors, can like that on 
LOCKYER: Thank you. 
ROBBINS: As we approach the end of our hearing, what I'd like to do is 
asked any I'll give, if he wishes the opportunity to ask one ••. 
TOM HAYDEN: Just a very brief one. 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: And then have a brief comment. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I agree with you that we should be working on 103 and not on 
alternatives. But what's being floated here by many is the New York version of no-fault. I'd like 
to you an opportunity to discuss the New York pricing. 
MR. NADER: I just say that the New York version passed about 50 years ago. And it 
with no-fault for very small cases, so it isn't the kind of verbal threshold that so:ne no-fault 
like initiative versions. I think New York teaches this very much about no-
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Senator Kopp has a 15-second question to ask. 
MR. NADER: Sure. 
SENATO KOPP: Did you get an answer to this letter to Jim Lynn? 
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MR. NADER: Yes. As a matter of fact-- I didn't get it from Jim I from 
Middlebrook (?) general counsel. I did want to bring it but send you a copy. 
SENATOR KOPP: I'd like to see it. 
MR. NADER: And if I may characterize it, basically, they say the real problems are auto 
runaway juries. We've always been in favor of safe ... 
CHAIRMAN ROBBINS: Let me, on that note, let me say that it has been very 
taken the time to appear at the Committee today. You've answered all of the 
them were that warmed the seat a little bit that you were 
you for that. 
Let me say that the I believe, takes very, very the to 
103. the will of the people and it gives the Legislature a and it is my 
prayer that the Legislature will rise to the challenge. There little excuse not to 
so for those who may wish to curry favor with the special interests. 
one last comment, which you commented we have a business-oriented court 
alifornia and we do. I sat in on the hearing before the as did. Every small 
alifornia insurance. The guy who a shoe store to carry 
insurance. The guy who has a business has to carry insurance in his truck. The 
has to carry insurance on its fleet of vehicles. businessman in California carries 
the business of California has as a stake in the insurance 
down the costs of insurance in California as the individual who will never any 
because he doesn't even have enough money to a house and he lives in 
ent. And it's my opinion that that business-oriented court will uphold 103 
for business in California, with the possible exception of one list of 
dominated by out-of-state and 
to overrule Proposition 103. Thank you for with us 
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As of Just 
of 
operations.l In recent years, insurers have used their control of the 
liability insurance marketplace as a weapon of involuntary servitude, 
enlisting businesses, medical professionals and manufacturers in an 
alliance to undermine the integrity of the courts and the rights of 
consumers. 
We now know, of course, that restrictions on the legal rights of 
consumers and victims to full compensation by wrongdoers, have virtually 
llQ impact upon insurance rates. Dozens of tort law restrictions since 
1986 in California have had no impact on rates -- yet today the 
insurance companies, anxious to avoid the impact of Proposition 103's 
rate cuts, demand that consumers surrender even more of their basic 
civil law rights! 
Consider some examples of the wholesale legislative retreat from 
California's once nationally-respected panoply of victims' civil law 
rights and remedies, drawn from a summary prepared by Senate Judiciary 
Committee Chair Bill Lockyer: 
• Proposition 51 -- This June 1986 ballot measure promoted by the 
surance industry, the medical and manufacturers lobbies promised an 
immediate 15% savings in insurance by restricting non-economic damages 
in joint and several liability cases. 
1988 Statutes 
• SB 1 (Doolittle) -- limits punitive damage claims against 
religious corporations. 
• SB 1978 (Lockyer) -- permits post-litigation inquiry into 
veracity of certificate of merit of architects and engineers. 
• SB 1755 (Lockyer) --provides immunity for negligence of 
volunteer directors and officers of non-profit corporations and medical 
trade associations if sufficient insurance coverage is in effect. 
• SB 2333 (Kopp) -- provides immunity for schools from strict 
liability for asbestos exposure. 
• SB 2427 (Rogers) -- provides immunity to restaurants donating 
food to non-profit food banks. 
• SB 2789 (Maddy) -- limits liability of lending institutions for 
large loans. 
• AB 2973 (O'Connell) 
for acts of police dogs. 
• AB 3224 (N. Waters) 
immunizes public entities from liability 
immunizes farmers from liability for 
1 One powerful sector of the insurance industry which has received little attention 
is the reinsurance system. The legislature should conduct an investigation of Lloyds 
and other reinsurers in order to bring them under proper regulatory and disclosure 
requirements. This will prevent actions by reinsurers which contribute to the 
destabilization of the insurance marketplace in California. 
Testimony of Ralph Nader -- Page 8 
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j s caused by dangerous conditions to persons invited on the farm 
produce charitable purposes. 
• AB 3473 lante) -- immunizes a physician from liability for 
etrical ligence when "on call." 
• AB 3694 (Harris) -- expands public entity immunity for land 
lures. 
AB 3 (Frazee) -- expands immunity of local elected officials. 
• SB 23 (Bergeson) -- overturns state supreme court case ch 
liability of lie entities which provided safety services on 
• SB 241 (Lockyer) -- the statutory embodiment of the infamous 
"nonaggression pact" between various trade associations, this law 
ishes tougher procedural hurdles for punitive damages awards, 
s product liability actions against tobacco, alcohol and butter 
r s, limits the obligation of insurance companies to 
independent counsel to insureds. 
~ SB 1526 (Lockyer) -- qualified immunity provided to volunteer 
irectors and some off rs non-profits if insurance secured or 
ffort made to secure insurance. 
• SB 1598 (Presley) -- provides that a violation of governmental 
manual or rule book does not create presumption of negligence unless the 
rule was formal adopted as a regulation or statute. 
• AB 1530 . Brown) -- permits corporations to immunize directors 
and f from 1 lity to the corporation for their negligence. 
• AB 19 ( irling -- immunizes public entities for injuries to 
s caused by police pursuits. 
In addition to these legislative infringements upon tort laws, a 
of recent court decisions have further limited tort laws: 
Foley y, Interactive Data Corp. (1988) -- eliminated tort remedies 
ful termination. 
Moradi - Shalal v. Fireman's Fund (1988) -- abolished bad faith 
rty party actions against insurers. 
Brown y, Superior Court (1988) eliminated most strict liability 
injuries caused by prescription drugs. 
s immodest list of legislative and judicial restrictions upon 
common law tort rights and remedies -- some centuries old -- has 
consumers and victims of important legal protections. Insurance 
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However, slators should follow the lead of the public, 
the elect resu s last November, and refuse to surrender 
economic pressure and propaganda of the industry. The array of 
ctions on victims' rights recently approved by the legislature 
ld led; an appropriate place to begin is SB 241, a measure 
had failed before the ink on the Governor's signature was 
r appropriate candidate for immediate repeal is MICRA, ch 
rteen years since its passage has deprived many victims of 
ctice of legal representation and full compensation for 
consider whether Prop 103's ication 
s Act and other consumer protection laws 
su c remedies to those victimized by the bad faith of 
surance companies, or whether other legislation is necessary in light 
Royal Globe decision. 
1 , proposals wh call for further sacrifices of the 
California c izens should be rejected; there are many 
e measures which the industry can adopt -- without s 
11 cut costs, improve safety and reduce surance rates. 
Loss Prevention 
Insurance s are indifferent to sa 
because they have become predominantly cash 
The profit is based on a percentage of their projected 
so the higher the cost, the greater the absolute dollar profit. 
more attention is paid to increasing investment income through 
volume. Less attention is paid to safety and engineering 
ions that cou reduce premiums but retain prudent underwriting 
Insurance s would much rather charge a premium of 
and then pay out $500 in claims, then charge $500 and pay $250, 
they would prefer having more money to put in investments and to 
financial objectives. 
this system, insurance companies lack incentive to reduce 
costs through better health and safety conditions. As a 
, even repeated litigation arising from well-known and identical 
z rdous products or services has not prompted the insurance industry 
ist hazards be eliminated. And with very few exceptions, 
have failed to exert their legendary political muscle in state 
is res and in. Congress, or advocate before regulatory agencies, to 
enact or maintain proven life-saving programs like the 55 mph speed 
1 , airbags, and the 5 mph bumper protection standard (the latter 
been reduced to an absurd 2 1/2 mph collision protection level 
bill s of dollars). Our 1987 survey of eleven major U.S. 
casualty company foundations showed that casualty prevent is 
much a priority for grants and other contributions. 
Trave contributed $10,000 to safety programs. Aetna, American 
Corporation, Chubb, Continental, and Farmers Insurance Group 
$5,000 or less. 
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We have challenged the insurance industry to disavow the assault 
on the civil justice system, and instead join with us in fighting for 
tougher loss prevention practices that would cut claims costs by 
reducing the source of claims -- preventable deaths and injuries. 
Attached you will find a letter to the Chairman of Aetna Life and 
Casualty, suggesting in detail a program of loss prevention that would 
dramatically reduce payouts and protect workers and consumers. To date, 
no insurer has made the necessary commitment to loss prevention. 
Conclusion 
The Prop. 103 victory is reverberating throughout the nation with 
the message that insurance consumers will be standipg up for their 
rights against unreasonable insurance rates, arbitrary practices and 
lobbying pressure by insurance companies and their corporate allies to 
take away victims' rights. Californians can be proud that their 
pioneering vote last November has given strength and direction to 
millions of consumers across the country. 
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James P. Lynn, Chairman 
Aetna Life and Casualty Company 
151 Farmington Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06156 
Dear t-:r. Lynn: 
January 26, l989 
I a~ writing to you about how Aetna car. reduce costs --
especia:ly thro~gh loss prevention -- instead of continuing its 
three decade drive to take away injured peoples' legal rights in 
courts of law. · 
!n9~rance co~Fanies say that Californians should be denied 
their right to receive Proposition 103's rate relief and 
insura~ce industry reform because, they say, Prop. 103 will cost 
them money. They say that the one-year 20 percent rate reduction 
ordered by Prop. 103 is unfair and unreasonable since auto 
insurance rates are already too low, and because "costs," i.e. 
leqal fees, medical bills and car-repair expenses, are rising. 
"The cost !ncreases have outpaced our ability to manage 
efficiently, so we have to charge more,h Safeco's president told 
the H.al.l Street JournaJ,. 
Rather than looking at their own waste, inefficiency, 
rnis~a~agement and inattention to loss prevention for the solution 
to controlling costs, insurers have spent many millions of 
dollars ca~paigning not only to defeat proposed reforms of the 
insurance industry, but to restrict the rights of victims to sue 
the pe=petrators of their harm and obtain fair co~pensation for 
injuries. 
Proposition l03's enactment, notwithstanding the industry's 
mu~ti-million dollar campaign to defeat it, has mobilized 
citizens nationwide to fight for strengthened regulation and 
increased competition for the insurance industry. Therefore, 
co~panies will have to look for ways to reduce their costs, 
specifically throush more efficient operation, and more effective 
advocacy for health and safety to prevent injuries and property 
da~aqe from occurring. 
1. E!fici.e.nc~ 
The insurance industry represents one of the greatest 
bundles of capital ever brought together in world history. 
Property/casualty companies in the United States have assets 
tota~ling over $300 billion; and over 2,000 life insurance 
companies have assets totalling over $900 billion. This huge 
industry, however, is an inefficient and wasteful bureaucracy. 
If insurance companies operated more efficiently, they could 
easily reduce rates. 
For example, in the private passenger automobile liability 
line, the industry overall pays 35.3 percent of what it writes in 
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loss adjustment and underwriting expenses, including claims 
processing, de!ense fees, commissions and brokers. Yet USAA, one 
of the best service companies in the ~arket, operates at only a 
20 percent expense level. According to the National Insurance 
Consu~er Organization, auto liability ins~rance rates would drop 
by an average of 19 percent nationally i! the industry on average 
were as efficient as USAA. 
Ir.surance compa~ies have operated so inefficiently in 
California and elsewhere because the insurance market is, in 
importa~t ways, not corr.petitive. Insurers engage in price-fixing 
because such practices are not subject to antitrust laws. In 
addition, states have anti-rebate laws which prohibit insurance 
agents froM offering discounts to policyholders. As a result, 
the most efficient agent can not compete for market share by 
offering a discount. Also, many state laws prohibit group auto 
and homeowner insurance sales which could enhance buyer 
bargaining power. And consumers do not have access to good, 
comparative information about prices and services. 
Proposition 103 repeals ~he antitrust exemption, the 
rebate and the group sales prohibition in California and allows 
banks t: sell liability insurance. Prop. 103 also provides for a 
computerized co~su~er information system to facilitate comparison 
shopping. These neasures should provide much needed incentive to 
insurers to reduce costs caused by waste and inefficiency. 
In addition, insurers could be doing much more than simply 
complaining about legal, medical and auto repair expenses which 
they say are drivir.g up their costs. For example, insurance 
compa~ies often insist that information they provide plaintiffs 
d~ring the discovery process in product liability cases be kept 
completely confidential. This not only keeps important safety 
inforrr.ation that can lead to hazard alerts and policies, from 
consumers and public agencies, but also it forces plaintiffs to 
start from scratch the discovery process in each similar case, 
driving up both plaintiff and defense legal fees. 
As for medical costs, health insurers like Aetna could be 
aggressively pushing for strict guidelines to reduce physician's 
misuse of unnecessary medical tests, like chest X-rays and 
electrocardiograms, as well as unnecessary surgery, which add 
billions to health care costs in this country. Former HEW 
Secretary Joe Califano recently observed in the M~H York times 
Magazipe that Americans are four times more likely to have 
coronary bypass surgery than Western Europeans with the same 
symptoms, ar.d that at least half of the 900,000 Caes~rean 
sections performed in 1986 were unnecessary. 
Insurance rates have risen out of all proportion to auto 
repair costs, according to the National Insura~ce Consumer 
Organization. Even so, however, insurers could be doing much 
more to encourage automobile design changes which would reduce 
repair costs without sacrificing safety, and reduce auto theft, 
which is responsible for the largest component of comprehensive 
insurance costs. I recently received a letter from a Houston 
inventor who has developed a patentable computer key system which 
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j cial , ~he contact insurance 
companies system is in fighting cla and 
essentially fending hazards. A few lu~inous exceptions have 
occur such as State Farm successfully itioned the 
C.S. Court of a!s to reverse NHTSA's 1981 rescission of the 
autoMatic restrB nt standards 1 or when State and Allst 
lle. 2 1/2 mph bumper protection st even 
II has only occasionally petitioned for auto recalls and 
even more rarely for new or stronger motor vehicle safety 
• 
demonstrate le attention pay 
loss ion, consider in 
e laws. ween 1966 and 1973, almost every 
a motorcycle helmet use law. by 1980, 29 
s~ates ha al or weakened their law and ir.surance companies 
did virtually nothing to stop them. More than 500 excess deaths 
many more serious injuries occur yearly in those states with 
~o cr weak helrne~ laws, compared to states with strong :aws. A 
ot r ex es serve o demonstrate what opportun ies 
ins~rance corr.panies have to reduce cla and there re co s 




y to raise 
the 36 states that 
reads past r, dea~hs on 
increa 19 percent -- an increase nearly 
in states that kept the 55 mph l 
surance i stry must share the blame 
ccsts resu ing from this predi able 
ss 
to 
have upped the 
se highways 
times as 
injuries. Althou9h the I!HS and some companies 
some suppo efforts to try to preserve the 55 mph speed 
1 , had the industry devoted its full polit 1 muscle to this 
issue, there is little doubt the industry could have prevailed on 
ss to preserve this proven highway safety measure. And now 
that im facts about increased deaths and injuries are in, 
are insurance companies not fighting to lower ghway speeds 
at sta~e level, or to ensure the 55 mph speed limit is 
maintained in sta:es which have not raised it? 
bags: The air bag can save at least 12,000 lives and 
of thousands of serious injuries a year in this country. 
So~e major auto insurers are providing some financial incentives 
to encourage purchases of cars equipped with air bags {although 
I! says the major AAA and other motor club insurers provide 
ive unless required to do eo by law as in New York 
I!HS says USAA's incentive program is exceptional 
unusually 1 scounts for cal 1 
ection cars equipped with air bags (60 percent, 
ter to James P. , Page 6. 
whe~e as most companies' discounts range from 20-3C percent r 
rr,edical and personal injury protection}. During 1988, USAA also 
ovi d $300 to policyholder who bought or leased a car 
d with an optiona: air bag (although the bonus to 
- , the air bag must have been 09tion~, and even this bonus 
s scontinued in 1989). 
if ~11 insurers put their muscle behind air bags by 
co~raging air retro-fitting, equipping their own entire 
y fleets w air as has Travelers Insurance Co., 
r mandate re ations for air bags or their 
i a_ents 1 more lives cou be saved and billions of 
dollars more cou_ saved annually in health costs, wage loss 
s il y 
Seatbelts: !~~ National Highway Transporta~ior. Safety 
Adninistration {N.HTSA) conservatively estimated that in 1987, 
" 25 percentage point rise in national belt use over 1984 
levels saved about 1,300 lives and preven~ed about 16,000 
moder e-tc-serious injuries. The resu ant reduction in 
aut ile insurance clai~s was roughly $1 billion to $2.5 
llion. Other p~blic and private insurers probably saved 
another $0.5 b!llion ~o $1.25 billion.H 
while seatbelt use in auto~obiles has reduced deaths~ 
seric~s injuries and insurance costs, it is not used to reduce 
. Also, these benefits have not been extended to workers 
mu9t drive dangerous vehicles on the job. For examplet 
accc to a 1987 Tri~l ~agazine article, at least 100 forklift 
operators are killed or seriously injured each year as they are 
thro~,o,·r~ out 1 or jump out of forklifts that accidentally tip over. 
~any tests have de~onstrated the effectiveness of seat belt use 
reventing these injuries, and although a few companies like 
Clar Eq~iprrent Co. and U.S. Steel require that seat belts be 
installed on forklifts, most insurance companies have not 
insi ed on this condition. 
Jam~s W. Srr.irles, national broker liaison with the Long 
Grove, 111.-based Kemper Group, told a risk managers' conference 
this year that in the worker compensation area, tr.e difference 
between a very good and a very bad safety record can cause them 
to raise premiums as much as 400 percent. Wouldn't workers be 
bet r off if insurers simply insisted that for continued 
coverage, employers provide safety protections so that their 
workers are protected from such accidents so that injuries and 
insurance claims can be reduced? 
5 mph bumper standard: Between 1978 and 1982, the government 
required a. 5 rr~ph bumper protection standard, which the Carter 
nistration's Department of Transportation estimated would 
save consumers over $400 million a year. Despite overwhelming 
consumer support for this standard, the Reagan administration, 
a er heavy lobbying by General Motors, rolled the bumper 
ection standard back to 2 1/2 mph. 
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While fender-bender accidents represent a large se;ment of 
ins-.;rance compar.y costs, ins'.lrance companies, with a few 
exceptions like Allstate and State Farm, paid very little 
attention to th:s development. !n addition to applying its 
lobbyin~ muscle in Congress, if net before the DOT to have 
prevented the rol!back of bu~per protection standards, insurers 
could have petit!c~ed the govern~ent to reinstate the standard 
once data on the 2 1/2 mph s~ar.dard's iwpact carne in. They did 
no~. Xoreover, insurers have not insisted on bumper standards 
for lig~: trucks and vans, which now co~prise about l/3 of all 
new vehicles sales. 
b. fir~ and Ele.c;,r!):al Safety. 
Deaths and inj~ries due to fire are largely preventable. In 
Ja;;ar:, for example, the rate of fire deaths is half that o:f the 
United States-- 25.7 per ~illion in the United States; 12.5 per 
millie~ ir. :apar.. 
7te insurance industry frequently points to its past help in 
orig:~ating the natio~al electrical code and establishing 
U~derwriters' Laboratories and the National Fire Protectio~ 
Association as examples of its past commitrr.ent to loss prevention 
and flre safety. Yet these efforts are small compared to what 
the i~dustry sto~ld be doing now to make these institutions real 
changeMagents rather than indentured servants. 
First, the industry-backed Underwriters' Laboratories' seal 
of approval on ele~trical devices does not always ensure the 
p~oduct's design safety. For example, after an alarming increase 
in reside~tial fires due to kerosene heater use, UL recently 
upgraded its kerosene he~ter standard, UL 647, to help reduce 
some of the fire deaths and injuries. However, the compromise 
sta~derd failed to address some problems, such as flare-ups and 
afterburn. See, fer exa~ple, the analysis in the 1988 report by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency/U.S. Fire A~inistration, 
"Alternative Heater Fires:·A Critical Review of Safety Issues." 
Moreover, after UL 6'7 was upgraded, retailers were still 
permitted to sell out existing stocks of substandard heaters. 
Sirr.ilarly, in a Novet.1ber, 1987, New Ys:itls Times. column, the 
president of a mailorder horne appliance company expressed outrage 
that uL's new standard to prevent electrocution from sccidental 
irr~ersion of hair dryers in water, applie~ only to hair dryers 
manufactured after October 1, 1987. Retailers were permitted to 
sell out their steak of substandard hair dryers. As a result, 
during the 1987 Christmas buying season, new and old dryers were 
on the shelves, both with UL labels, and consumers could not tell 
which were substandard. 
Moreover, insura~ce companies have not actively promoted the 
fire-safe cigarette, nor advocated strongly for residential 
sprir.klers. They recently have pushed for tougher criminal laws 
for arsonists, and have assisted efforts to help catch arsonists 
with the Insurance Committee for Arson Control and the Insurance 
Crime Prevention I~stitute. But David Hemenway, an economist at 
.ttl 
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the Harvard School of Public Health and a Pew Fellow in Injury 
Con:~ol who has studied insurance indus~ry efforts to promote 
residential fire safety, has written that the site Qf thesa 
gf!o&Z$ is m!~sc~l~ co~pared to tbe size of the insurance 
i;Jd·Jat.x.:i.~ng, the maa.n.i.t~e of the fire pro~l,rr.. 'It:.is is an 
i~ortant observaticn. The insurance ind~stry, when it goes 
beyond mere rhetoric, rarely puts more than a tiny fraction of 
its tes~~tcas and power beyond public and private safety, health 
ana property darrage prevention efforts. But Ae~na and other 
co~panias are kno~n to lobby very vigoro~sly against victims' 
rights or repeal of t~e McCarran-Ferquson Act. 
Insurers have released very little useful statistical fire 
data to those responsible for ensuring safety, or to 
po:icy~olders. Nor do insu~ers operationally cooperate with 
ongoing corr.mun:it~' efforts at fire pr·evention. For exarr.ple, or.e 
well-known anti-arson group undertook a program to prevent many 
ot the most notorious p:r:operties in New York City from getting 
fire insurance. Accc~ding to a 1985 article in ~itizen 
&:.a;;,tj.-::.~a:.1.wn. mag~zine, the gro'.lp wrote to every insurance 
corrpany known to provide fire insurance in its area, offering to 
sha!"e wi":h those cornpa.r.ies some of its own credible "early-
warning" data as en aid in evaluating insurance r!sks. Wi~h the 
no~able exception of the Liberty M~tual insurance company, the 
group's letters and phone calls drew what it termed an 
"unenthusiastic response." According to the article, other 
gro~ps which also offered to work with insurers reported 
sim!larly disappointing results, "raising suspicions that some 
i:'lsurance compa:1ies don't much care about inner-ci t.y arson, so 
long as the premiums keep rolling in to cover it." 
In addition to exchanging information and mere strongly 
advocating !ire safety measures, Hemenway suggests that insurers 
should o:fer policyholder discounts to enco~rage fire prevention. 
For example, only in the past few years have residential insurers 
includ~d discounts for s~oke detectors and for net smoking, and 
these discounts have neither been large nor well-pu~licized. 
Such discounts should be expanded to include use of less 
dangerous wiring and heating systems and !or non-flammable 
furnishings. 
c. Products: 
It is estimated that nearly 100,000 deaths and millions of 
injuries each year are product-related, and are occurring at 
increasing rates. There are many ways insurance companies can 
function to control and minimize these hazards which cause death 
and injury. 
For example, by implementing a structured disclosure 
program, insurance companies can do a great deal to assist those 
responsible for ffiaking products or services safer. According to 
safety research cons~ltant David v. MacCollum, former president 
of the American Society of Safety Engineers, insurance companies 
should be collecting daea on equipment, identifying injuries by 
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particular hazards, and maintaining a central data bank on hazard 
information, narratives of occurrences and available safeguards. 
For each claim or disputed injury, insurance companies should be 
routinely identifying the product hazard or unsafe condition 
which resulted in the claim, including the make and model of any 
produc~ that se:ved as the host for the hazard, or any chemical 
that could cause toxic injury. Companies should publish annual 
su~maries of all death or injury-related occurrences, assuring 
public access to this information. These data are crucial for 
regulatory agencies, for those injured by such products, and for 
the popu:ace so they may be alerted to unsafe products and 
conditions. 
Ir.terna:ly, insurance compan~es with mul~iple lines, like 
wor~e~s' corrpensation and product liability, shou:d forward 
infcrrr.a: :.on rego.rding hazards and equipme!lt fror.t one line to 
another. In addition, information abo~t hazardo~s cond!tions and 
products and those which repeatedly cause serious harm should be 
CO:':'t;i':l.lr.ica:ed to law enforcement officials, as well as advertised 
to t.he public. 
I~surance coMpanies should also require implementation of 
hazard prevention measures as part of the insurance contract, 
particularly after a claim is submitted and specific hazard 
prevention measures identified. Af:er a legitimate claim is 
paid, the insurer should routinely conduct a hazard analysis of 
the produ=t or unsafe circums~ance. 
The i~surance industry's lack of concern in controlling even 
the rr.cst serious hazards that the industry insures, was clearly 
evident during the House Subco~~ittee on Surface Transportation 
of the Comn1.:ttee on Public Wo:rl<.s and Transportation hearings, May 
19, 1968, on the transportation of hazardous materials. There 
are 500,000 shipments of hazardo~s and toxic materials moved each 
day thrcugh1 what Rep. Douglas li.pplegate called "an archaic 
hazardous materials transportation system." DOT reported 
incidents of hazardous spills in 1986 were 5,700, and the Office 
of Technology Assessment says that as many as 50 percent of 
incidents are not reported. 
Twenty-five witnesses testified at this hearing, including 
ger.~rators or hazardous wastes (e.g., the chemical manufacturers 
and corporations like DuPont)/ transporters of haza~dous wastes 
(e.g., truckers, shippers); emergency manasement specialists 
(e.g., the Federal Emergency Management A9ency,); and state and 
local government associations (e.g., National Governors 
Association) • Not one insurance company nor insurance industry 
representative testified or even filed materials for the record. 
d. Smokin.a. 
According to findings reported by PrideMark Young & Simon, 
smokers cost insurance companies 54% more for health care than do 
non-smokers. It is a mass· tragedy that the life and health 
insurance industries did not crusade against cigarette smoking 
promotions and establish anti-smoking clinics years ago. Over 
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the years, Ree~~['S ~i;~s: did mo~e this area than did 
insurers such as Metropolita~, Prudential, the Equitable and John 
Hancock. 
According to safety resea~ch consultant MacCollu~, "If the 
exis:ence of an effective ha2ard prevention progra~ within an 
institution ~ere used as st criteria for p~oviding 
underwriting covera;e compensation, product 
liability, public 11 insurance, we would 
not, today, need tc lem of exorbitant 
insurance ra:es." s assets soaring 
prof:ts, insurance c es have a great opportunity to 
contribute :o a of health safety by working to 
eli~inate or reduce hazardous products, services and conditions. 
A.11d the~· v:j,.:!.l ir claims co s the process. 
Instead cf a major corn.rr.itment by Aetna in these directions, 
yo~r co~pany is spen.j.ing 1 sums to prejudice public opinion 
aga~nst the right~ of inp rsons to plead before juries for 
ju~:ice. Presently, in at. lea four states -- Cclorado, 
Louisiana, St. Lcu~s and ate -- you are spending 
many policytolder9' llars new ads a~d 
e:ectronic media spots. The these are replete 
with w~ld m1s sentations not reflect the regular 
di~p~siticn o: cases ccu=ts. se ads are far •• f~r :e~A 
than would ct 's coverup of its 
edge about t -eld mutilations a 1ng explici~ly 
represe~tative of urance industry's practices. 
Is this the way s to spend money -- caricaturing 
t:l.s A.'T;erica!i legal systerr. better than any Kre=nlin propagandist 
co~ld de? Does Aec~a want to provoke an aroused public agains~ 
its o· rageous distortions or would r r enlist an aroused 
pJblic o s prevention j er -- ranging from 
motor cycle helreet use to sa mo~or c s, cal devices 
and pharmaceuticals? Let's hear from you, Mr. lynn. Which 
specific projects do you sh to have your company work on, that 
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dennilers Laboratories for for fire-prone 
development of 
insurers led the way in on standards 
such as with elevator cables and boiler 
monitoring. 
Accompanying the strides of the century has been a 
rapid expansion in the We know a great deal 
about machine and environmental 
and industrial accidents. Yet statistics show that the 
and nm into the mil-
lions Researchers at the National of Sciences say that 
are the number one cause of death for Americans 
years of age, an estimated 4 million years in 
In the latest such caused 
more than deaths 70 million nonfatal including 
80,000 permanent disabilities 2 
Today, the insurance 
icantly society's health and loss 
The industry itself has enormous resources to devote to 
ments. The 3,000-plus in the United States 
have assets totalling over $300 3 and over life insurance 
companies have assets over $800 billion.4 
Yet despite its growth in size and the insurance industry is 
nowhere near the factor in loss it achieved in the s Even 
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repeated litigation arising from well known and identical hazardous 
product models or services has not prompted the insurance industry to 
ins1st on elimination of avotdable dangers. Insurance companies are let· 
ting hazards continue to cause accidents at increasing rates, forcing 
workers and consumers to assume the risk of death or serious injury. 
There are many ways insurance companies can function to control and 
minimize haz.ards which cause injury or death. 
J. Disclosure of Information 
Insurance companies are in a unique position to disclose information 
about hazards to those responsible for ensuring safety, and to the public. 
Insurance companies, however, have typically resisted information shar-
ing outside the industry. The experience of some community anti-arson 
groups in New York City, in their attempts to obtain basic information 
and cooperation from insurance companies in their anti-arson efforts, 
typifies this attitude. One group undertook a program to prevent many 
of the most notorious properties in New York from getting fire insur-
ance. According to a 1985 article in Citizen Participation magazine, the 
group wrote to every insurance company known to provide fire insurance 
in its area, offering to share with those companies some of its own credi-
ble "early-warning" data as an aid in evaluating insurance risks. 6 With 
the notable exception of the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the 
group's letters and phone calls drew what they termed an "unenthusias-
tic response. " 7 Other groups which also offered to work with insurers 
reported similarly disappointing results, "raising suspicions that some in-
surance companies don't much care about inner-city arson, so long as the 
premiums keep rolling in to cover it."8 Similarly, in a letter published in 
the New York Times, Stanley Bulbach, Director of Communities United 
for Research and Education for AIDS, discussed the importance of 
AIDS education in controlling the disease, but noted resistance by insur-
ers to scale down escalating insurance claims by promoting education on 
AIDS through billing newsletters.Q 
By implementing a structured disclosure program, insurance compa-
nies can do a great deal to assist those responsible for making products or 
services safer. For example, according to safety research consultant 
David V. former president of the American of 
Safety Engineers, insurance companies should be collecting data on 
A,., for Residenlial Firt! buuranu. 15 I'Oi'\ Snm. J. 415. 411> (1987) (understanding factors 
3ffecung mceniiVt'> of in~urcr\ necn..ary 10 du:il Mlpport in hazard redu,uon) 
I> Deliben. Tilt• Burning Qr.u•nion. C!tUI.N P\IHICIP.\TION, Summer 1985 at 10, II 
7 /d. 
II. ld 
9. NY Ttmn. M!u. 22. 191$7. § 3. at 20. col. 2. 
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equipment, identifying injuries by particular and maintaining a 
central data hank on hazard information, narratives of occurrences and 
available !>afcguard~. 1" For each claim or d1spu1ed injury, insurance com-
panic\ should be routinely Identifying the hazard or unsafe condition 
which resulted in the daim, includmg the make and model of any prod-
uct that served a~ the hn;,t for the hazard, or any chemical that could 
cause tox1c inJury. 11 Companies should publish annual summaries of all 
death or injury-related occurrences, assuring public access to this mfor-
mation.12 Information about ultrahazardous conditions and those which 
repeatedly cause serious harm should be communicated to law enforce-
ment officiab, as well as advertised to the public. Internally, insurance 
compame~ with multiple like workers' compensation and product 
liability, should forward information regarding hazards and equipment 
from one line to another. 1 1 
2. Rating and Coverage 
Companies should use their own rating function to penalize insureds 
who do not improve safety. Insurance companies should also require 
implementation of hazard prevention measures as part of the insurance 
contract, particularly after a claim is submitted and specific hazard pre· 
vention measure!> identified. 14 After a legitimate claim is paid, the in-
!>urer should routinely conduct a hazard analy<ois of the product or unsafe 
circumstance and refuse to continue coverage until all the hazards un· 
covered by the analysis are removed and the risk of injury reduced. 15 
How often do insurers with their engineers accomplish these missions? 
3. Regulatory Agencies 
also be effective advocates for safety im· 
Virtually all regulatory :u11•ru••.-.. 
opportunities for outside 
process. For years, citi· 
zens have taken of these petitioning agencies such as 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission for product standards, or the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nuclear safety standards, or asking 
for the removal of toxic, or pharmaceutical hazards. Yet in-
surance companies, with many more finam.:ial re!>ources than the average 
lO D Mar\.\>llum. Thcr,· " No Such Thing A,, A tml'ulity Cn,l\-lt·, The A!-N:nc~ nf 
I!Jt.m.l l'rc\tlllhlll lhJt', l!unmp. ll'' 4·5 !ullpuhli,hetl manu,nrptl. 
ll /d ill ~h 
12 '" I 1 ld al 2X 
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ci!Jzen, have largely stayed clear of regulatory Even in the 
safety area, only the Insurance Institute for H1ghway Safety, which does 
not consider itself an insurance industry trade association, has 
occasionally for auto safety recalls and even more rarely for new or 
stronger motor vehicle safety standards. 
Without question, improved safety regulations could have a direct im-
pact on insurance claims. In the fire prevention area, regulations requir-
ing more fire resistant mattresses and furniture, which went into effect in 
the 1970s, have had some effect in reducing household fires. According to 
figures compiled by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4,240 
Americans died in 623,000 residential fires in 1984, down from 757,500 
home fires and 5,500 deaths reported in 1980. 16 But this figure still re-
mains higher per capita than many other nations, according to James F. 
Hoebel, manager of the commission's Fire and Thermal Burn Hazards 
Office. 17 
4. Litigation 
Related to their regulatory responsibilities, insurance companies can 
seek enforcement of health and safety standards through judicial pro-
ceedings. Unforlunately, most contact which insurance companies have 
with the court system is in fighting claims and essentially defending 
hazards. A luminous exception occurred when State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Company, the nation's largest insurance company, 
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals to review the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) 1981-rescission of 
the automatic restraint standard.'M In June, 1983, the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the State Farm position and found 
the NHTSA decision illegal. 19 
5. Research and Development 
Insurance companies devote minimal effort and resources towards re-
search and development in the area of hazard or disea!.e prevention. Ac-
cording to David M. Pharis, president of the Philadelphia-based S.T. 
Hudson Inlernational which specializes in loss control, quoted in the 
May 21, 1986 Journal of Commerce, 
[T)he quality of [ri~kJ managers has improved considerably over the 
16 Tougher Sll:mdurd.t Help Reduce Ftre Toll. l CoM .. Aug 20, 1986. at lh. 
17. Jd 
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) car~. hut we are \I ill talking about who are used lo with 
he linam:1al ekmcn!\ of n~k control. The eng111t~crmg aspect 1:. !>Ome· 
f01 whtch corpora lion~ have not yet seen tht~ benefit of allocating 
fund'>. Even msureP;, m thetr loss-control departments, have no! by 
f d ~ . 20 and large allocated ~tgmlicant un s tor engmcenng. 
In add111on. even where engineers are on staff in insurance company 
los~ control departments, they may be without relevant experience or 
training m the field of safety. According to safety research consultant 
MacCollum, 
Generally the engineer with training in a conventional discipline has 
littlr pradical knowledge in the field of hazard prevention. Currently 
only a ft·w ~dmols teach ha:tard prevention principles to undergraduate 
engmccrs. Such courses are elective and are not a requirement to ob-
tam a degree, and, therefore, a very small percentage of engineers have 
been exposed to any in~tructmn on the methodology necessary to iden-
tify and control ha:tards21 
6. Selling Standards in Their Own Shop 
insurance companies -should set their own loss prevention and hazard 
control examples. For example, by the end of 1986, the Travelers Insur-
ance Company should have completed conversion of its entire fleet to 
driver-side air bag cars. According to Travelers' Senior Vice-President 
Peter Lihassi, "Looked at from a purely economic point of view, our 
investment has already paid for itself. The hospitalization and rehabilita· 
tion co~ts, lost work time, or possible death benefits would have exceeded 
the actual cmt of equipping our cars with air bags."22 Allstate and 
Aetna insurance companies have also purchased air bag cars for their 
fleets. Others, such as Prudential, have not. 
As another example, according to findings reported by PrideMark 
Young & Simon, smokers cost insurance companies 54% more for health 
care than do nonsmokers. ' In a recent letter to the New York Times, 
G. Kar~on, Dm:~.:tor of the Center for Corporate Public Involve-
ment, noted that some insurance companies have taken the positive step 
of smoking in their offices or have restricted smoking 
to certam designated area-.. 24 It is a mass that the life and health 
in'ourance industries did not crusade smoking promo~ 
tions and cstahlish antismoking clinics years ago. The Reader's Digest 
Z.llh\\JC/. Rt1i. JfuthJJ;cn' Roh• Expo11<1!, J. CoM .. May 21, 1986, at I -Ia, col. 3 
D MacC••IIum. 111pru lillie 10, al 24 
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did far more in this area than insurers such as Metropolitan, Prudential, 
the Equitable, and John Hancock. 
The insurance industry's overall indifference to loss prevention-their 
failure to apply these functions to major environmental, product and pro-
fessional hazards-has been a significant contributor to the "insurance 
cnsis" of the mid-1980s. Consumers and businesses have been hll with 
skyrocketing insurance premiums, reduced coverage, and arbitrary can-
cellations. According to safety research consultant MacCollum, "(i]f the 
existence of an effective hazard prevention program withjn an institution 
were used as the foremost criteria for providing underwriting coverage 
for worker's compensation, product liability, public liability, and other 
such insurance, we would not, today, need to be addressing the problem 
of exorbitant insurance rates. " 25 
In October, 1986, Richard Wade, International Technology Corpora-
tion's Director of Environmental Risk Management Services, said in a 
panel discussion on pollution liability, that pollution liability risks would 
be more insurable if there were more attention paid to risk assessment 
and risk control. In particular, he said most pollution risk assessments 
fail to evaluate accident probability and emergency response plans so 
that accidental chemical spills can be cleaned up before contaminating 
the ground water. He also described most problems as the result of inad-
equate maintenance, improper training of workers, or too little capital 
paying for safeguards. 26 Another panelist, Michael Baram of the Boston 
University School of Medicine, criticized the insurance industry's failure 
to use environmental specialists or epidemiologists who can assess the 
relationship between substances and illness in risk assessments. 27 
The insurance industry, in some cases, has even provoked those re-
sponsible for safety protection into ignoring loss prevention. In a recent 
phone conversation, Tim Holt, Executive Vice President of the National 
School Supply and Equipment Association, stated that the group has not 
had much time "to devote to safety" due to the "distraction" of trying to 
find and maintain adequate insurance coverage during the insurance cri-
sis. "Liability has distracted us from the task of creating safer products," 
said Holt. "Consumers are the ones who suffer." 
According to loss control specialist Pharis, 
Insurers spend approximately 70% of their money on losses. Some 
20% is spent on commissions and operating expenses. Perhap~ 6% 
shows up in expenses for salaries and expenses for claims people and 
underwriters. Nevertheless, when the [people] at the top begm worrying 
25. Ma.:Collum, supro note 10, a1 I 
26 Young. Group To Toke On Environmental Rislu, J. CoM., (kl 2'1, 19Xo. dl I. ml 2 
27. Jd. 
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ahnut poor lo~' ratio~. everybody ~tarts attacking the 6%. They begin 
cuttmg hac!- on staff and '>alarics anJ talk about bad pricing. But 
what'~ really killing them is that 70% in losse-;2 M 
One rca!>on msurance companies have become uninterested in doing 
'omcthing about loss prevention is that they have become predominantly 
ca~h llow linancial institutions, and have moved away from their risk 
management functions. More and more attention is being paid to in-
crea..,ing investment income through premium volume. They pay Jess at-
tention to safety and engineering contributions that could reduce 
premium~ but retain prudent underwriting profits. For example, in the 
early 19HOs when interest rates were high, the industry cut prices in order 
to obtain premium dollars to invest at high interest rates. The companies 
wanted premiums so quickly for high interest bearing investments that 
they even sold a $75 million retroactive insurance policy for the 1981 
MGM Grand Hotel fire in Nevada-after the fire. 29 
These days, because of the investment income generated, an insurance 
industry executive would rather charge a $200 premium and risk paying 
out $100 in claims, than charge a $100 premium and risk paying out $50 
in claims. 
On January 20, 1987, we launched a survey of eleven major United 
States property/casualty company foundations to determine whether Joss 
prevention, hazard prevention, or system safety programs are accorded 
high priorities for grants or other contributions. Our preliminary re-
sponses are not particularly encouraging for prevention of casualties. 
I. Of $6,796,018 total grants in 1985 by the Aetna Life and Casu-
alty Company Foundation, the only safety contribution was $5,000 to 
an Indianapolis, Indiana, Volunteer Fire Department. 311 Approxi-
mately $195,000 went to health care programs and institutional chan-
tie~ for the handicapped. According to The Foundation Center Source 
Book Profile, the foundation docs not support medical research. Inter-
e,tmgly, however, the Aetna Foundation recently gave a grant to the 
National Center for Small Communities to study ways to prevent mu-
ntc•pal msurance-related loss in small communities. The results are still 
pending, but according to the National Association of Towns and 
Townships, in-depth interviews with sixteen insurance and risk man-
agement experts revealed that officials "generally felt [that) towns and 
town~htps ought to appeal to in!>urers themselves for expertise in de-
2X. Zul~ew•o. 1upra nole 20 
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signing and operating risk reduction activitie~." 31 
2. In 1985, American Financial Corporation Foundatton ofCincm-
nati, Oh1o, gave no safety grants. 12 The foundatton gave appro:lllmatdy 
$20,<XXl to health related charities and around $2 mtllion to hospital,. 
3. As a policy, The Chubb Foundation of Warren, New Jersey, 
awards no grants for loss prevention programs. H Thetr grants constst 
only of scholarships to dependents and relatives of employee~ for col-
lege or junior college degrees. 34 Chubb does publish a brochure 
describing its loss control services. JS 
4. In 198'5, The Continental Corporation Foundation of New York, 
New York, gave a number of small matching grants, most under $100, 
and some larger grants totalling less than $ IO,<XXl, to various he all h 
care programs and charities. No contributions were made to safety 
programs. 36 
5. Farmers Insurance Group Safety Foundation of Los Angeles, 
California, would not respond to our survey, but 1985 public records 
show $3,<XXl in contributions to safety-oriented groups, and $1,<XXl to 
health care programs. 37 
6. In 1985, The Travelers Companies Foundation, Inc. of Hartford, 
Connecticut, gave $10,<XXl to safety programs, 38 and several hundred 
thousand dollars to geriatric care and research, infant care, and health 
care. Travelers also noted "a long history of supporting safety mea'>-
ures that reduce automobile accident deaths," including support of 
mandatory seat belt laws and federal legislation to mandate air bags or 
some other nonbelt automatic protection for the front seat."' 
7. The USF&G Foundation of Baltimore, Maryland, did not re-
spond to our survey with a list of contributions, although they noted 
that some health care and safety programs received granls in 1985.~" 
The foundation did outline safety surveys conducted by the company 
JJ NATION ... t ASSOCIATION OF TOWNS AND TOWNSHIPS, MANAGIM.> RI~K I~ S~.t\11 
TOWN AMERICA, PRELIMINARY REPORT 3 (1987). 
32. Income Tu Rerurn for 1985, Form 990, American Fmancial Corporauon Fnundalion. 
The foundauon ga\le approximalely S20,000 10 health related charille!o and around $I nulhon 
10 ho~patal~ /d. 
33 Telephone interview conducted by Ruth Ann Paui'>On wilh Hcnr} Harder. Chut>h 
Foundation (Mar. 12. 1987). 
34. /d.; see THI: CHUBB FOUl' DATION, A CAll. FOR APPIIC,\TIOI'S ION S( llUI \M~Ifii'S 
TO 81. AWAIIDt.D IN Rt.COLM fiON 01· ACIIILVLMI:N'I (1'1!!6) 
35. CHt:BB GIIOJ..P OF INSUIIANCt COMPANILS, Loss CONTROl, Till VII \I La~a.; 
(19!!6). 
36. Income Tax Return for 1985, Form 990. The Continental Corporation Found.llll)Jl 
. n Income Tu Re!Urn for 19M5. Form 990, Farmers Insurance Group Safel~ Founda1111n 
JH Lefler from Ern(SI L O..bome, Pre\adent, The Travelel'\ Companie' Fouud~lum. ln.:. 
to Ralph Nader (Feb. 16, 1987). 
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40 lener from E Donald Bangs, Executive Vice President. USF&G Foundation. lo 
Ralph Nader (feb 4. 1987). 
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and :.lated support for seat belts for its fleet and for air bags "when 
made available." 
K. Cigna FoundatiOn of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has not re-
~pondcd to our survey. 
9. American International Group Foundation of New York, New 
York, ha~ 1ssued no response to date. 
10. CNA Insurance Company Foundation of Chicago, Illinois re-
fused to respond. 41 
II. St. Paul Companies of St. Paul, Minnesota, has issued no re-
sponse to date. 
Another informal survey of this country's major auto insurance carri-
ers reveals that some insurance companies are providing financial incen-
tives to encourage purchases of cars equipped with air bags. 
Travelers offers medical premium discounts-IS% to policyholders 
with a driver-side air bag or 30% for those with a full front seat air bag. 
The savings for an average policyholder with a 1987 Volvo containing a 
driver-side air bag would be around $30 per year. With a full front seat 
bag, the savings would double to $60 per year. To qualify for this deduc-
tion, the purchaser must have a signed paper verifying the air bag's in-
stallation at the time of purchase.42 
Allstate offers discounts on total medical and comprehensive premi· 
ums-20% to policyholders with a driver-side air bag and 30% to those 
with a full front seat air bag. This discount does not apply to collision 
insurance.4 J 
Nationwide offers discounts on total medical and comprehensive pre-
miums-25% to policyholders with a driver-side air bag and 40% to 
those with a full front seat air bag. This amounts to almost $80 per year 
for average policyholders with a fully-equipped full front seat air bag.44 
Starting on March 23, 1987, Prudential is offering a 30% medical pre-
mium discount for policyholders with full front seat air bags, provided 
the consumer verifies the air bag purchase.45 
The Hartford Insurance Group, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance. 
Company, Aetna Life and Casualty, and Safeco have adopted an advi-
41 Leiter from Suzanne J. Reade, Public Affairs Consultant, CNA Insurance Company 
Foundauon. 10 Ralph Nader (Mar. 18, 1987). 
42. Telephone interview conducted by J1m Mussleman with Peter Libusi, The Travelers 
Companies (Mar. 5, 1987) . 
4.1 Telephone interview conducted by Jim Mussleman with Bob Montgomery, Allstate 
Jn,urancc Company (Mar. 23. 1987). 
44. Telephone interview conducted by Jim Muulernan with Becky Wasenjo, Nationwide 
Jn,uran.:c Company (Mar. 23, 1987) 
45. Telephone mtenriew conducted by Jim Muuleman with !vall Lu1o, Prudcnti11l Insur-
ance Company !May 7, 1987). 
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sory rule of the Insurance Services Organization4 t. which recommends a 
30% medical premium discount for a full front seat atr bag and a 20% 
medical premium discount for a driver's side air bag. 47 
State Farm offers no discount for air bag equipped cars, claiming a 
lack of available actuarial data that air bags cut down insurance costs. 4 " 
Besides offering di!>counts, insurance companies should encourage air 
bag retrofitting. Companies should increase donations to pro-air bag 
public safety organizations. 
In the medical malpractice area, insurance companies should be seek-
ing to decrease the large number of unnecessary operations, X-rays, and 
drug prescriptions, improve the handling of X-ray equipment, improve 
the quality of emergency and intensive care, reduce hosp1tal mfect1ons, 
and increase peer review. 
Much improvement can be made in the area of emergency care. A 
recent study of claims files managed by the Risk Management Founda-
tion of the Harvard Medical Institutions, relating to clinical fellows 
moonlighting outside of institutions where they were employed between 
April, 1976, to October, 1986, found that physicians with fellowships 111 
internal medicine and its subspecialties were at greatest risk of emer-
gency room related moonlighting claims.. 49 In a recent article, the foun-
dation encouraged risk managers and insurance programs to strengthen 
loss prevention programs in the emergency room setting; to enforce a 
stringent credentialling process to all physician applicants including 
those for moonlighting positions; to monitor and evaluate care regularly 
as part of the hospital-wide risk management and quality assurance pro-
grams; and to support strong loss prevention programs through additions 
or modifications to insurance underwriting criteria such as by requmng 
additional evidence of pertinent training for fellows who desire to moon-
light in emergency rooms. so Very few malpractice insurance companies 
do anything regarding loss prevention or provide the state med1cal licens-
ing review board with evidence of serious physician malpractice. 
In areas of school sports safety, the Seattle schools have an athletic 
safety program which has been a model for safety programs throughout 
40. Tekphone mterview conducted by J1m Mu~sleman with Rea Tyler. ln,urance lll\totuh: 
for Htgh•u) Safety (Apr. 16. 1987). 
47. Telephone inteniew conducted b~ Jtm Mu~~leman with June Bruce. lmuranc<' s~n · 
tee-. Orttaniullon (Apr. lb. 19K7). let' Pa.mve R,•,trulllt DIIWIIIII, (i-5 I?>.St.:M \'<CI Stk\'ICI s 
OHilt. PIU'-AII: PAssi.MiHt Anor.~oi!Ht M~'' "' (1983!. 
4M T dephone interview •:onduc·ted h) Jtm Mu\\lcman wuh L.aura Sulhvan. State Farm 
lnwran<r Comp.n~ (Mar. 23. !9~7) . . 
49. Rtsll. :\h'-'<·1 \H' 1 FoL """'no,, Clm~tul I cllow.\ wuh f.tmllt'd f.m<''II<'III'Y Can· 
Etpmena Target• uf "Mounltghtmg" Cla1ms. 8 FOMl:M 6·7. 14 (Jan.-Apr I9M7) 
50. ld at 7. 14. 
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the country and should be promoted by insurance companies. 51 The 
components of the safety program include: 
-Development of forms which tell parents and participants of the 
ri~ks and potential dangers in graphic, comprehensive detail. 
-Formation of safety guidelines for each sport to give to coaches. 
-Traming of coaches in the area of sports medicine (31 hours). 
-A record-keepmg mechanism which details training done and inju-
ries received every day. The record-keeping helps discover patterns in 
injune~ which may be cues that something is wrong. 
-Requirement of a physician's authorization before an athlete may 
return after a malady or mjury. There is also coach involvement in the 
rehabilitation program. 
The Texas School Services Foundation has another model program to 
which insurance companies should pay close attention. 52 Included are: 
-Pre-employment screening to determine what physical labor an 
employee can sustain. 
-Investigations after every accident, once to recommend ways to 
make the workplace safer, and again to ensure that the recommenda-
tion~ are acted upon., 
-A risk control manual for distribution to the school. 
Lo~s prevention provides the insurance industry with great opportu-
nity to combine its vested interest in profits with social contribmions to 
health and safety. By insisting on the elimination or reduction of hazard-
ous products, services, and conditions, insurance companies can become 
the sentinels for health and safety. They will not perform those missions 
as long as they spend millions of dollars in advertised demands to restrict 
victims' rights, diminish and inflate a phony lawsuit crisis into 
a corporate strategy for callous abdication of loss prevention 
responsibilities. 
51 Telephone interview conducted by Ruth Ann Paui'IOI'I with 0~ Gregory, Genenl 
Cmm~el. Nal!onaf School Boord~ Association (Mar. 20. 191!7). 
52. ld. 
